TOP SECRET

53334 Copy no. 5

13 April 1951

ENDRAKUM	FOR	25X ⁻

SUBJECT: Consus and Worlflostion of All Argod Passes and Armosphie

- 1. The Hish may welcome a discussion of an agreement on consum and werification of armed forces and eraments in the hope that:
 - 2. Propagands adventages might be wen by denouncing the efforts of the US to secure a precise, unequivacal agreement as efforts to block any agreement on armaments.
 - i. Such a discussion might divide the US from its allies became of their segurness to evoid the secrifices necessitated by rearessent, and to find some basis for an occasionation with the USSS.
 - 5. The US, to avoid discension with its allies, might be induced to accept an agreement under which the USS would gain more than the US.
- 2. Since the knowledge of Seriet stranscate possessed by the 15 is fregmentery and in many cases shedow, while the knowledge of 15 stranscate possessed by the USS is extensive and precise, from the point of view of acquiring intelligence information, the US would goin much more than the USSE from an agreement on compass and verification which was honsetly and fully carried out.

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- 3. We believe that the USUR, if it should enter into an agreement on consus and verification, would not carry out the agreement homestly and fully.
- A. If it were possible to draft an agreement of census and verification which would protest the interests of the US, we believe it unlikely that the USER would enter into any such agreement.
- 5. We believe that the USSR, in any event, would not enter into any agreement of consus and verification unless it believed that the agreement provided it with the opportunity:
 - a. of filling critical gaps in its information about the US before the US sould fill critical gaps in its information about the USSE, and
 - b. of breaking off the agreement when it had filled those critical gaps.
- 6. Under any agreement for consus and verification there is grave danger that the USEL would find means to assumplish the purposes set forth in paragraph 5.

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MALTER B. SMITE

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-). We believe that the USCE, if it should enter into an agreement on consus and verification, would not carry out the agreement beneatly and fully.
- 4. If it were possible to draft an agreement of census and verification which would protect the interests of the US, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would enter into any such agreement.
- 5. We believe that the USER, in any event, would not enter into any agreement of consus and verification unless it believed that the agreement provided it with the apportunity:
 - a. of filling critical gaps in its information shout the W before the W could fill critical gaps in its information about the URSE, and
 - b. of breaking off the egreement when it had filled those critical gaps.
- 6. Under may agreement for consus and varification there is grave danger that the USSM would find means to accomplish the purposes set forth in paragraph 5.

1/5/

WALTER B. SNITH

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